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1. The term RTA is used throughout this article to refer to customs unions (CU), free trade 
agreements (FTA) and interim arrangements leading to either a CU or FTA as those terms are 
understood within GATT Article XXIV. The use of the term carries no geographic connota-
tions (i.e. it applies to agreements between countries in different regions, such as the US--Jor-
dan FTA). 
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ABSTRACT 
In the mid-1990s, the policy debate within the WTO focused on whether regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) were building blocks or stumbling blocks for the WTO sys-
tem, essentially questioning whether regionalism was appropriate at all from an eco-
nomic policy perspective. Given the proliferation of RTAs since that time and the 
inability to roll back the clock, that policy debate has been replaced by a search for 
strengthened constraints on RTA activity that might ensure it complements the 
WTO system. Three major controversies within many existing RTAs are the exclu-
sion of agriculture from coverage, complex and restrictive rules of origin, and varied 
treatment of the application of trade remedies. Despite some competing policy con-
siderations, it is likely, on balance, that the WTO system would benefit if agriculture 
was required to be included in RTA coverage, if RTA rules of origin were simplified 
and liberalized, and if the controversy surrounding RTA treatment of trade reme-
dies was cleared up. However, the search for constraints within the WTO system to 
achieve these results, either through the Doha negotiations or the dispute settlement 
system seems unlikely to succeed in the near future. Accordingly, enhanced and ex-
tended efforts by the US, either unilaterally or in conjunction with its RTA partners 
utilizing its negotiating leverage, may be a necessary supplement to efforts within 
the WTO in ensuring a more harmonious relationship between RTAs and the WTO 
system. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Virtually every important WTO member is now party to a Regional Trade 
Agreement (RTA)1 and roughly one-half of world trade occurs under pref-
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2. See www.wto.org (click on trade topics and click on regional trade agreement). 
3. Arguments include: (i) the domino effect--creating incentives for third countries, i.e. those 
outside a given RTA, particularly one featuring a large market such as the US or EU, to par-
ticipate in multilateral liberalization to reduce negative preference margins they face; (ii) 
serving as laboratories for experimentation with rules in new areas, e.g. services, intellectual 
property, etc and (iii) locking in reforms in developing countries. For a discussion of many 
of these arguments, see, generally, Robert Z. Lawrence, ‘Emerging Regional Arrangements: 
Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?’ in Richard O’Brien (ed.), Finance and the International 
Economy (1991); Richard E. Baldwin, ‘A Domino Theory of Regionalism’, in Baldwin et al. 
(eds), Expanding Membership of the EU 25 (1995). 
4. Arguments include: (i) those countries in RTA relationships with big markets have less incen-
tive to engage in multilateral liberalization efforts within the WTO and thereby lessen their 
margins of preference; (ii) an alternative response for third countries is to pursue an RTA 
with the large market, i.e. become an ‘insider’ rather than ‘outsider’; (iii) RTAs use up neces-
sary political capital and attention, as well as negotiating capacity, to the detriment of multi-
lateral trade liberalization within the GATT/WTO system; and (iv) RTAs create a spaghetti 
bowl of trade regimes adding large administrative cost to traders and governments alike. See, 
generally, Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, ‘Preferential Trading Areas and Multi-
lateralism--Strangers, Friends or Foes?’ in Bhagwati and Panagariya (eds), The Economics of 
Preferential Trade Agreements (1996); Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, The Dangerous 
Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995). 
erential tariff rates. Through the end of 2006, over 368 RTAs were notified to 
the WTO of which over 260 occurred after January 1995, reflecting a surge in 
RTA activity that actually began in the late 1980s/early 1990s. It is estimated 
that by 2010, over 400 RTAs will have been implemented worldwide.2 The 
debate in academic and policy circles in the 1990s focused on whether RTAs 
were building blocks3 or stumbling blocks4 for the multilateral system. Spe-
cific criticism was directed at the United States for its pursuit of regionalism 
because of its undue bargaining power in bilateral and small group negoti-
ations. However, US abstinence from RTA negotiations from 1995-2000 did 
nothing to stem the tide of regionalism. Moreover, the US has traditionally 
only turned to a robust regional agenda when the WTO system has stalled in 
achieving further trade liberalization. 
 Given the proliferation of RTAs, the inability to turn back the clock and 
the political and diplomatic capital the US has invested in reinvigorating its 
RTA agenda, the policy debate has moved to an acceptance of the existence of 
RTAs and a focus on mechanisms both within the WTO system and outside 
that system that might ensure that this robust RTA activity complements, 
rather than detracts from, the WTO system. Part I of this article examines 
three major controversies associated with RTAs: the exclusion of agriculture 
from significant liberalization in many RTAs, complex and restrictive rules of 
origin established by RTAs, and the varied treatment of trade remedy laws 
within RTAs. Part II examines existing WTO constraints on the use of RTAs 
and explores the possibility of strengthening WTO constraints, in particular 
to eliminate some of the negative consequences flowing from these controver-
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5. See John Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 576 (1969)(discussing whether GATT 
Art. XXIV conditions actually implement this trade creation v trade diversion test); Ken 
Dam, ‘Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATT: The Legacy of Misconception,’ 30 
University of Chicago Law Review. 615 (1963)(questioning whether GATT Art. XXIV uti-
lizes this test). 
sies. Part III considers what efforts the US could undertake either unilaterally 
or in conjunction with RTA partners to help ensure that regionalism comple-
ments the global trading system. The analysis in Parts II and III reveals a po-
tentially large irony: unilateral actions by the US and actions in conjunction 
with its RTA partners using the significant negotiating leverage of the US in 
bilateral and regional negotiations may be more successful than efforts within 
the WTO, or at least a necessary supplement to efforts within the WTO, at en-
suring that RTAs better complement the WTO system. 
I. MAJOR CONTROVERSIES REGARDING RTAs 
 The original GATT (1947-94) and subsequently the WTO system (1995 to 
present) both allow an exception for RTAs in part because it was thought that 
the trade creation effects of an RTA that complied with certain conditions laid 
out in the GATT/WTO system would outweigh any trade diversionary ef-
fects (i.e. the growth in trade between the RTA countries would outweigh the 
loss of trade between third countries and the RTA countries).5 However, the 
ambiguities in the conditions laid out in the GATT/WTO system for RTAs 
have lead to at least three major controversies in the way RTAs have been 
structured: (i) many RTAs exclude agriculture from coverage, at least to some 
exent; (ii) many RTAs have highly complex and restrictive rules of origin that 
might divert trade from third countries as RTA partner countries use inputs 
from partner countries rather than cheaper inputs from third countries to 
comply with the rules of origin necessary to gain the preferential tariff rates 
under the RTA and (iii) many RTAs do not eliminate the application of trade 
remedies to products from RTA partner countries, thus not leading to full lib-
eralization of internal trade within the RTA, but may give some special treat-
ment in this regard, potentially creating third country impacts. Aside from 
the legal ambiguities allowing for these controversies, each of these major 
problems has many economic nuances and numerous competing policy con-
siderations as not only must the trade creation v trade diversion issue be con-
sidered but also the impact of these RTA features on countries incentives to 
be forthcoming in WTO negotiations. 
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6. See WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/46, 5 April 2002. 
7. According to the WTO study, more than three-quarters of the RTA relationships had less than 
50% of agricultural tariff lines at zero duty rates. See WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/46, 5 April 
2002. 
8. Particularly low levels of harmonization occur with EC, Israel and Turkey RTAs. See ibid. 
9. Of course, for the small percentage of RTAs that constitute customs unions and achieve 
deeper levels of integration, such as the EU, the behavior in the WTO may be even more pro-
tectionist because of the potential for their negotiating position to gravitate towards the most 
protectionist country in the customs union. Experience seems to back this view up, although 
some commentators have argued the opposite--that creation of customs unions with deeper 
integration, as with the EU, actually leads to greater liberalization because the views/votes 
of the most protectionist member are offset by other members of the customs union and ‘na-
tional champions in every industry’ are no longer ensured. See Lawrence, above n 3. Which 
view is correct can depend on a variety of factors within the customs union, including voting 
practices, informal decision making practices, and other political and economic issues under 
consideration by member countries of the customs union at the time. 
A. The exclusion of agriculture 
 A WTO study early in the Doha Round of negotiations confirmed, both in 
terms of percentage of trade and duty-free tariff lines, that agriculture is not 
liberalized nearly as much as industrial products in RTAs.6 Many RTAs uti-
lize a negative list approach (covered unless specifically excluded) for indus-
trial products and, in contrast, employ a positive list approach (not covered 
unless specifically included) for agricultural products. Additionally, when an 
agricultural product is included in an RTA, it tends to be subject to tariff re-
duction but not duty elimination.7 Finally, there is less harmonization across 
overlapping RTAs in agriculture8 and tariff peaks are more likely to remain 
in the agricultural sector. 
 The reason for this phenomenon is that the behavior of countries within 
their RTAs on agricultural issues tends largely to parallel their behavior on 
agricultural issues in the WTO.9 Under this line of thinking, the exclusion of 
agriculture is merely another symptom or manifestation of the same political 
sensitivities that prevent significant liberalization in the WTO. However, it 
may be that allowing RTA activity that largely excludes agriculture is indeed 
harming multilateral liberalization efforts within the WTO. RTAs that exclude 
agricultural products allow countries to obtain increased market access in in-
dustrial products and engage in new rule development without having to en-
gage in the politically tough liberalization of agriculture--something that they 
could not get away with in the WTO’s ‘package deal’ framework of negotia-
tions. Assuming the countries pursuing RTAs without agricultural liberaliza-
tion would chose not to pursue them if they were required to include agricul-
tural goods in a more fulsome manner, then the WTO would be the exclusive 
forum for them to pursue industrial goods liberalization and new rules cre-
ation, and they would only obtain this liberalization and the new rules in ex-
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10. While some might counter that forcing agricultural liberalization in RTAs would simply use 
up countries’ political capital and reduce the chances for liberalization multilaterally, on bal-
ance, it appears that requiring RTAs to include agriculture would be a boost for multilateral 
liberalization, both in agricultural and other areas. 
11. Professor Bhagwati (Columbia) coined this term. See Jagdish Bhagwati, ‘The Agenda of the 
WTO,’ in van Dijck and Faber (eds), Challenges to the World Trade Organization (1996) 27, 49. 
On the impact of rules of origin, see also WTO Secretariat, Rules of Origin in Regional Trade 
Agreements, WTO Doc. WT/REG/W/45, 5 April 2002. 
change for agricultural liberalization.10 Alternatively, countries might actu-
ally pursue RTAs that include agriculture more fully and thus start chipping 
away at the enormous protectionist sentiment in this sector, albeit with some 
potential for significant trade diversion as high MFN tariff rates charged to 
third countries impact demand from those countries as compared with RTA 
partner country products subject to preferential rates. Another possible sce-
nario is that countries with defensive interests in the agricultural sector might 
simply pursue RTAs with countries that do not threaten their agricultural 
sectors, but this would at least reduce the amount of RTA activity and still in-
crease the pressure on governments to utilize the WTO forum. Regardless of 
which of these scenarios played out, a requirement to include agriculture in 
RTAs would be a net benefit for the WTO system. 
B. Complex and restrictive RTA rules of origin 
 RTAs include rules of origin to ensure that products more closely con-
nected with a third country do not receive preferential treatment under the 
RTA without the third country paying reciprocal tariff concessions. RTA 
rules of origin tend to be more restrictive (stringent) than non-preferential 
rules of origin utilized by countries, particularly on sensitive items. Concerns 
have been expressed that overly restrictive RTA rules of origin magnify the 
trade and investment diversionary effect of RTAs. The more complex and re-
strictive the RTA rules of origin, the more they can lead to companies within 
the region using partner country inputs rather than cheaper third country in-
puts in order to ensure compliance with the rules of origin necessary to ob-
tain the preferential tariff treatment afforded by the RTA. 
 The shear complexity of the rules, particularly when one considers that 
many countries are parties to numerous overlapping RTAs, creates substan-
tial administrative and compliance costs for traders and customs administra-
tors (often referred to as the spaghetti bowl effect).11 Indeed, for products in 
which the MFN tariff rate is low (and thus there is a low preference margin) 
some traders simply elect to pay the MFN rate than suffer the administrative 
costs of complying with the RTA rules of origin (e.g. a significant amount of 
US-Mexico trade occurs at the MFN rate). 
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12. See, e.g. WTO Appellate Body Report, United States--Definitive Safeguard Measures on Im-
ports of Wheat Gluten From the EC, WTO Doc. WT/DS166/AB/R, adopted 22 December 
2000. 
 However, one irony is that further RTA activity may lessen this spaghetti 
bowl effect as ‘consolidation’ occurs among overlapping RTAs. Broad re-
gional RTAs, such as the expansion of the EU from 15 to 25 countries after 
the enlargement of the EU to include most of central and eastern Europe in 
2004, and the now-stalled Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) ne-
gotiations among 34 countries, may reduce, although clearly not eliminate, 
the complexity. Another competing consideration is that stringent rules of or-
igin maximize the incentives of third countries to engage in multilateral lib-
eralization since they have little opportunity to ‘free ride’ on preferences in 
the RTA. Despite these competing considerations, on balance, it is generally 
agreed from a policy perspective that less stringent and less complex RTA 
rules of origin would be better at achieving GATT Article XXIV’s goal of cre-
ating trade among RTA partners without diverting it from third countries. 
C. The treatment of trade remedies (safeguards, anti-dumping) 
 RTAs vary widely in how they address the application of trade remedy 
laws among members--from virtual exclusion from such remedies (although 
usually in the case of safeguards with the establishment of a lesser RTA-spe-
cific emergency remedy) to continued application of both global safeguards 
and anti-dumping laws. However, exclusion from trade remedy laws is rare 
compared to continued application of such laws. 
 Many countries are of two minds on the issue of trade remedies in RTAs. 
Most greatly desire to be excluded from the application of such laws, particu-
larly by large market countries such as the US, in their RTAs with those coun-
tries as it would lead to greater trade liberalization. However, when they are 
outside an RTA offering exclusion, partial or full, from a trade remedy law, 
they believe their interests are hurt by such exclusion, i.e. they ‘take a bigger 
hit’ when remedies are applied. The WTO Appellate Body has not ruled on 
whether excluding RTA partners from the application of trade remedy laws 
is required, allowed or prohibited by GATT’s exception for regional trade 
agreements, but they have lessened the latter concern by ruling that there 
must be parallelism between the imports investigated and the remedy (i.e. 
a country cannot include RTA partner imports in the investigation--thereby 
making it more likely that imports will be viewed as a cause of injury to do-
mestic industry--and then exclude them at the remedy stage).12 
 The treatment of trade remedy laws within US and other large market 
RTAs can have a significant impact on countries’ willingness to pursue mul-
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13. For example, Australia, having been affected already by US safeguards actions on lamb and 
steel, showed a great interest in the question of application of US safeguards law in its FTA 
negotiations with the US. 
14. Of course, the concern of other countries is that the US will not be able to make significant 
enough concessions on anti-dumping in the Doha negotiations given the enormous resistance 
to changing anti-dumping laws in the US Congress. 
tilateral liberalization. The US continues to be the largest user of anti-dump-
ing laws (although the EU is also a large user and many developing countries 
are significantly increasing their use of such laws). If the US were to begin of-
fering exclusion from anti-dumping laws in its RTAs, then those RTA partner 
countries would have a reduced incentive to engage in the multilateral liber-
alization processes. Similarly, safeguard remedial actions have substantially 
increased since the creation of the WTO in 1995 (and the banning of so-called 
gray measures such as voluntary restraint agreements). Thus, exclusion from 
application of global safeguards is also something desirable for US RTA ne-
gotiating partner countries.13 The US market, in terms of MFN tariff rates, is 
relatively open. Thus, the largest complaint of foreign trading partners of the 
US tends to focus on extensive use of so-called ‘contingent protectionism’ or 
trade remedy laws. 
 Of course, one could make similar arguments regarding exclusion of trade 
remedies to those made with respect to the inclusion of agriculture. If coun-
tries were required to exempt RTA partners from trade remedies, then at 
least some countries, such as the US, might largely cease RTA activity due 
to the political sensitivity of changing or weakening trade remedy laws. Al-
ternatively, they may conclude RTAs that exempt partner countries from 
trade remedies, thus slowly chipping away at the protectionist sensitivities, 
although possibly increasing third country impacts. On balance, however, it 
is likely that multilateral liberalization efforts will benefit from the US pre-
serving at least the anti-dumping negotiating chip for the Doha Round as this 
chip is one of the few significant ones the US maintains to force further MFN 
tariff liberalization within other countries (US MFN rates, as mentioned be-
fore, generally being quite low already).14 Because application of US safe-
guards remedies is not as big a negotiating chip as anti-dumping laws, it is 
probably not too harmful to the WTO trade liberalization process if the US re-
places global safeguards remedies with RTA-specific emergency remedies vis 
a vis its RTA partner countries. 
II. STRENGTHENED WTO CONSTRAINTS ON RTAs 
 The three major controversies surrounding RTAs persist due to the lack 
of clarity surrounding the existing constraints within the WTO. Institutional 
mechanisms within the WTO system do exist for clarifying and strengthening 
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15. For a lengthy and detailed analysis, see Robert Hudec and James Southwick, ‘Regionalism 
and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of Discriminating Fairly,’ in Mendoza, Low and 
Kotschwar (eds), Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations 
(1999) 47-81; WTO Secretariat, Compendium of Issues Related to Regional Trade Agreements, WTO 
Doc. TN/RL/W/8/Rev.1, 1 August 2002. See generally, John Jackson, World Trade and the 
Law of GATT 576 (1969); John Jackson, The World Trading System (1997) 163-173. 
16. These exceptions relate to certain agricultural programs (the scope of which has been re-
duced by the Uruguay Round Agriculture Agreement), balance of payments considerations, 
and the so-called general exceptions clause of GATT (protection of human health, conserva-
tion of exhaustible natural resources, etc.). The question is raised whether this list of excep-
tions is exclusive or not. One strong argument that the list is not exclusive is that it fails to list 
the so-called national security exception found in Art. XXI. It seems unlikely the drafters en-
visioned preventing a country joining an RTA from applying a security- related measure to 
its RTA partners. See Hudec and Southwick, above n 15, at 66. 
17. While quite similar, the language regarding customs unions is not identical to that regarding 
FTAs, for the simple reason that customs unions adopt common regimes vis a vis third party 
trade while FTAs do not. See, e.g. the language ‘on the whole’ inserted with respect to cus-
toms unions but not FTAs. 
18. The US basically succeeded in having its position on the three issues in contention at the 
time Spain and Portugal joined the EU in 1986 incorporated into the Uruguay Round Un-
these existing constraints, however, numerous complications have previously 
prevented and may continue to prevent the mechanisms from being success-
fully utilized. 
A. Existing constraints15 
 GATT Article XXIV permits the formation of customs unions, free trade 
agreements and interim agreements leading to the formation of such agree-
ments ‘within a reasonable length of time’. However, the language of Arti-
cle XXIV is broad, imprecise language that, when combined with inadequate 
review and monitoring, leaves considerable room in practice for auto-inter-
pretation by members to an RTA. (The corresponding language in General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) Article V and the language in the En-
abling Clause permitting RTAs between developing countries are filled with 
as much if not more uncertainty and wiggle room). Article XXIV declares that 
the purpose of an RTA should be to facilitate trade between its members and 
‘not to raise barriers to the trade’ of third countries. In terms of internal re-
quirements for an RTA, Article XXIV requires that ‘duties and other restric-
tive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted by 
Art. XI, XII, XIV, XV, and XX)16 are eliminated with respect to substantially 
all trade’. In terms of external requirements, an RTA cannot impose ‘duties 
and other regulations of commerce that are higher or more restrictive’ than 
the general incidence of duties and regulations of commerce existing in the 
RTA members’ territories prior to the formation of the RTA.17 The Uruguay 
Round Understanding on Article XXIV clarified certain issues related to com-
pensation negotiations and assessing tariff barriers affecting third party trade 
upon the formation or enlargement of a customs union18 and also clarified 
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derstanding. For the US and EU positions at the time, see Working Party Report, Accession of 
Portugal and Spain to the European Communities, GATT 35th Supp. BISD (1989) 295-300. The 
assessment of whether barriers are higher after the accession is to be based on an overall 
assessment of weighted average tariff rates and duties collected (not based on trade cov-
erage), is to be done by WTO country of origin, and is to be based on the applied rates of 
duty. 
19. However, as Hudec and Southwick point out, there are some ‘conceptual problems’ in 
considering whether RTA rules of origin to fit within the term ‘other regulations of com-
merce’. Specifically, in considering whether such rules are ‘higher or more restrictive’ af-
ter the FTA than before, we run into the problem of what is the ‘before’--because prior to 
the RTA there were no RTA rules of origin. While one might look to rules of origin of other 
preferential programs or another RTA, the rules in those programs are designed to deter-
mine eligibility to a program with a fundamentally ‘different purpose or scope than the 
RTA’ under consideration. See Hudec and Southwick, above n 15, at 57. Note that there 
may also be complications in comparing different rule of origin regimes existing under 
different programs and agreements to determine whether one is more restrictive than the 
other. See ibid, at 59. 
that a reasonable period of time for an interim arrangement was generally to 
be taken to mean ten years. However, the Understanding did not clarify sev-
eral terms related to the specific problems arising out of the increased RTA 
activity described above. 
 First, the term ‘substantially all trade’ was not clarified, leaving open the 
question of whether such a determination should be based on trade cover-
age or tariff lines or some combination. For example, the question can be 
raised whether an RTA that excludes agriculture meets the substantially all 
requirement if agriculture is a small percentage of trade between the RTA 
members (perhaps because of high trade barriers) and taking account of the 
fact that agricultural products constitute roughly 15% of tariff lines. The 
preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding states that WTO members 
recognize that the contribution of RTAs to the expansion of world trade is 
‘diminished if any major sector is excluded’. While this language might help 
influence the interpretation of the term ‘substantially all’, it is not an obliga-
tion in and of itself. 
 Second, the Understanding did not clarify whether the exceptions list to 
the substantially all requirement is an exclusive list or not. Thus, the question 
can be raised whether, internally, an RTA would be required (or at least per-
mitted) to eliminate the application of trade remedy laws (e.g. safeguards au-
thorized by GATT Article XIX and anti-dumping duties authorized by GATT 
Article VI) among members. 
 Third, the terms ‘other regulations of commerce’ and ‘other restrictive 
regulations of commerce’ were not clarified, leaving open the question of 
whether RTA rules of origin are included within the meaning of these terms. 
For example, the question can be raised whether rules of origin should be in-
cluded in an assessment of whether barriers to third country trade are higher 
or more restrictive than pre-RTA barriers19 or even taken into account when 
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20. For instance, if a high percentage of trade continues to occur under MFN rather than RTA 
rates because of complex rules of origin, one might argue that this portion of trade has not 
been liberalized within the RTA. 
21. Information in this section comes from the WTO web site, www.wto.org (click on regional 
trade agreements). 
22. I leave aside the slight possibility of the WTO membership utilizing its formal interpreta-
tion or amendment powers because such powers have rarely been utilized and would almost 
surely not occur in the context of RTA disciplines with negotiations in the Doha Round occur-
ring that allow for trade-offs among many issues. 
23. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, para. 29, adopted 14 November 2001. 
determining whether substantially all trade has been liberalized among RTA 
members.20 
B. Existing review and monitoring procedures21 
 GATT Article XXIV requires countries to ‘promptly notify’ other WTO 
members when deciding to enter an RTA and to make available such in-
formation as will enable WTO members to make reports and recommenda-
tions. In practice, many notifications occur after RTAs are finalized. Under 
the GATT, individual working parties were established to examine RTAs that 
were notified to the body. In virtually every review, the working parties were 
unable to come to any consensus on the consistency of the RTA with Article 
XXIV requirements. In February 1996, the General Council created the Com-
mittee on RTAs in an effort to improve the review and monitoring of RTAs. 
However, significant problems remain. The committee has only reached con-
sensus on WTO consistency in one case and even most factual examinations 
of RTAs prepared by the Committee have been held up from adoption. Fur-
ther, the chairmen of the committee complained in 2002 of the unwillingness 
of countries to provide, or significant delays in providing, information on 
their RTAs for the factual examination reports. Some of this unwillingness 
was alleged to be a result of so-called ‘dispute settlement awareness’ (i.e. fear 
that the information will lead to and/or be used against them in a future dis-
pute settlement case). 
C. Forums for strengthening constraints 
 Two possible avenues exist for strengthening the current WTO constraints 
on RTAs: the broad Doha Round negotiations (originally launched in 2001) 
and the WTO dispute settlement system.22 
1. Negotiations 
 The Doha Ministerial Declaration launching the current round of WTO 
negotiations provides for the following mandate for negotiations on RTAs: 
‘clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures under the existing 
WTO provisions applying to regional trade agreements’.23 The literature on 
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24. See, e.g. Meredith Lewis, ‘The Free Trade Agreement Paradox’, 21 New Zealand Universities 
Law Review (2005) at 554, 574. 
25. It should be noted that the US Administration previously explored with Congress the idea of 
‘docking’ agreements in which the US would negotiate a deal with one nation in a region and 
another country in the region ‘could join into the basic set of rules and structure--probably 
with a separate market access agreement’, according to former USTR Ambassador Zoellick. 
26. See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W186, 3 August 2005. 
27. See Joseph A. LaNasa III, 90 American Journal of International Law (1996) at 625, 637, fn 60 
(not proposing it, but describing that it was at one point considered). 
28. See T.N. Srinivasan, ‘Regionalism in the WTO: Is Non-Discrimination Passe?’, in Anne 
Krueger (ed.), The WTO as an International Organization (1998). 
RTAs is filled with many far-reaching proposals for improving WTO disci-
plines. Most of these are not politically feasible, although some far-reach-
ing proposals in the literature have actually seen reflection in government 
proposals. 
 For example, in an effort to end the discrimination against third countries 
created by RTAs, it has been suggested that the WTO should require that an 
‘open accession’ clause be included in all RTAs.24 The proposal ignores the 
key question of what concessions would be required of countries wishing to 
join, keeping in mind that the phase out periods on tariffs on certain goods is 
important even if all trade were to be liberalized within an RTA. Such a re-
quirement also ignores the non-trade goals that are important considerations 
when choosing RTA partners (e.g. Cuba is not a participant in FTAA nego-
tiations).25 Yet, Taiwan proposed that the WTO require such a clause to be 
put in all RTA agreements, explaining in response to criticism, that it simply 
would require an opportunity to negotiate.26 There have also been sugges-
tions that the WTO should hold negotiations to harmonize preferential rules 
of origin.27 However, the exceedingly slow progress in the harmonization ne-
gotiations of non-preferential rules of origin (initially due to be concluded in 
1997 but continuing today) cautions against proceeding with negotiations on 
the trickier topic of preferential rules of origin. 
 Another proposal in the literature was a proposal that all RTA tariff 
cuts be extended on an MFN basis five years from the cut thereby limiting 
the length of time preferences under an RTA could remain in place to five 
years.28 This proposal, if adopted wholesale, might lead to ‘dirty’ RTAs with 
even more numerous carve-outs and/or dramatically reduce the incentive of 
third countries to engage in multilateral liberalization (and simply free-ride 
on RTA tariff cuts as they are multilateralized). However, a US proposal in 
the Doha Round in 2003 for elimination of all tariffs globally by the year 2015 
would have achieved the advantages of the academic proposal (by limiting 
the length of time that RTA preferences would remain in place) but without 
the disadvantages because it would not allow for any free riders. Of course, 
most other countries considered the US proposal too far-reaching and polit-
ically infeasible as well because developing countries would lose their pref-
erences under GSP and other schemes in the industrialized countries’ mar-
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29. Proposals submitted by the governments during the negotiations included the following: (i) 
notification in advance of RTA texts being finalized or ratified; (ii) providing information not 
just on a trade flow basis, as is currently done, but also a tariff line basis; (iii) biennial report-
ing on implementation of RTAs; (iv) having the WTO Secretariat or independent groups of 
experts prepare the factual reports on RTAs and (v) clarifying the legal status of factual exam-
ination reports (so as to end virtual paralysis in adopting such reports and perhaps eliminate 
the ‘dispute settlement awareness’ problem). 
30. See WTO web site at www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/rta-May07_ e.html 
kets and there would be adverse consequences for those developing countries 
heavily dependent on duties as a source of government revenue (in the ab-
sence of improved tax structures and enforcement). To date, only very mod-
est transparency proposals have succeeded in the Doha negotiations and 
even modest substantive or systemic proposals continue to create significant 
disagreement among WTO members. 
 a. Transparency agreement. The Doha negotiations led to an agreement 
among governments to increase transparency regarding RTAs.29 In July 2006, 
WTO members agreed to provisionally implement, pending conclusion of 
the negotiating round, an agreement that requires WTO members to: (i) in-
form other members of the launch of negotiations of an RTA; (ii) inform other 
members of the signature of an agreement and (iii) formally notify an RTA 
immediately upon ratification. Thus, other members become aware of and 
can track an RTA’s progress from start to finish. The transparency agreement 
also requires notification to the WTO of changes in implementation or oper-
ation of an RTA that occur after the original notification. Information flow is 
improved by the transparency agreement as it lays out the information that 
must be provided in notifications including tariff-line data on concessions 
made in the agreement, trade volume data, rule of origin formulations, etc. 
Additionally, the dispute settlement awareness problem is partially resolved 
because factual reports are now prepared by the WTO Secretariat in consulta-
tion with the relevant parties.30 
 While this transparency agreement is a potentially useful step forward, it 
does not resolve any of the substantive differences over key terms in Article 
XXIV. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that implementation of the trans-
parency agreement is still dependent on the good faith of members (as well as 
enhanced peer pressure) for compliance and that, generally, there are not any 
significant penalties for failing to comply with notification/transparency ob-
ligations (as many countries have found out with notification obligations in 
other WTO agreements). 
 b. Substantive/Systemic proposals. Government proposals on substan-
tive or systemic issues have generally focused on clarifying the term ‘substan-
tially all’ trade (and the related issues of ‘other regulations of commerce’ and 
‘other restrictive regulations of commerce’). As regards the issue of ‘ substan-
tially all’ trade, members are still in discussions as to whether to use a trade 
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31. See, e.g. the Japanese submission, WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/190, 28 October 2005. 
32. See ibid. 
33. See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/180, 13 May 2005. 
34. See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/190, 28 October 2005. 
35. See WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/179, 12 May 2005. 
volume-based test or a tariff-line based test or some combination of the two. 
The problem with a pure tariff-line based test is that parties to an RTA could 
liberalize a very high percentage of tariff lines but still not liberalize a high 
percentage of trade if the tariff lines they refuse to liberalize currently con-
stitute a large percentage of the trade between the countries to the RTA. The 
problem with a pure trade-based test is that trade volumes can fluctuate (and 
thus an agreement’s consistency under a trade-based test might fluctuate as 
well).31 A trade-based test might also allow countries to an RTA to exclude 
many tariff lines from liberalization that currently do not have much trade 
but might in the future were tariffs to be lowered.32 Thus, many countries are 
leaning towards some sort of combined test, particularly those interested in 
curing the agriculture-exclusion problem riddling many current RTAs. For 
example, Australia, a significant agricultural exporter, has proposed a type 
of combined test.33 Australia’s submission suggests that at least 70% of tar-
iff lines be liberalized immediately upon entry into force of an RTA and that 
95% of tariff lines be fully liberalized within ten years of conclusion of an 
RTA. To address, the problem of a few tariff lines with high trade volumes 
being excluded, Australia would supplement its tariff line approach with a 
requirement that the top 50 tariff lines in terms of trade volume be included 
in the duty elimination under the RTA or that any tariff line that constituted 
0.2% of total imports be included in the liberalization. 
 Other countries are not satisfied with a pure quantitative test and want to 
at least supplement any quantitative test with qualitative factors. For exam-
ple, Japan proposed that the following qualitative factors be considered: (i) 
the exclusion of any major sector (although the combined quantitative test of 
Australia would do a good job of ensuring this does not occur in an RTA); (ii) 
the influence of trade remedy measures; (iii) the extent of tariff reduction; (iv) 
an assessment of tariff rate quotas and (v) tariff elimination with long imple-
mentation periods.34 These qualitative factors obviously tie into other issues 
such as what constitutes ‘other regulations of commerce’ and the ‘reason-
able period of time’ to implement an interim agreement leading to an RTA. 
The European Union also favors a qualitative as well as quantitative assess-
ment of RTAs adding a few other factors that might be considered, includ-
ing special safeguards in RTAs and seasonal restrictions on products. [FN35] 
However, qualitative factors might lead to the same ambiguity regarding 
the consistency of the RTAs with WTO disciplines as occurs today and some 
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36. More recently, the EU has stated that ‘any future clarifications would have to take into ac-
count such variations in approaches by Members, while going beyond lowest common de-
nominator’. WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/179, 12 May 2005. 
37. WTO Doc. TN/RL/W/185. 
38. Under the GATT, there was only one case brought against an RTA within the dispute settle-
ment system. ‘In the early 1980s, the United States complained of a series of regional agree-
ments concluded between the EC and Mediterranean countries because they lacked a plan or 
schedule for completion within a reasonable time and were not reciprocal in some aspects. 
After a long delay in the proceedings, the panel issued a report in 1985 in which it said that it 
countries may be suggesting such factors to keep the ‘waters muddy’ and 
protect non-robust RTAs from challenge. 
 With respect to clarifying the term ‘other regulations of commerce’, India 
has proposed that it be explicitly agreed that RTA rules of origin fall within 
the term ‘other regulations of commerce’. India’s proposal also suggests a re-
quirement that RTA rules of origin be no more restrictive than the most lib-
eral GSP scheme operated by any country member to the RTA. Very few, if 
any, RTAs, would currently comply with such a condition so one can imag-
ine the distance that still needs to be bridged in the negotiations on this issue. 
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the variations in RTAs, not much compro-
mise or consensus has been achieved on substantive and systemic issues to 
control RTAs. No draft consensus text has been prepared; indeed, govern-
ments have even been reluctant to submit text-based proposals. 
 c. ‘Grandfathering’ issue. Some countries, including the European Union, 
suggested early in the negotiations that existing RTAs should be ‘grandfa-
thered’, i.e. exempted from any new constraints developed in the course of 
negotiations.36 This should be strongly resisted for several reasons. First, it 
could affect the second avenue to strengthening constraints within the WTO 
system, namely, it may, depending on how phrased, directly or indirectly af-
fect the ability of a WTO member to successfully challenge an existing RTA 
in the WTO dispute settlement system. Second, to the extent new substan-
tive constraints only impact or deter future RTAs, those constraints may lock 
in place a worse state of affairs than would exist with further regional activ-
ity for, as noted above, some of the broader regional initiatives currently un-
derway may actually help reduce the existing spaghetti bowl effect. Third, as 
China pointed out in its submission, grandfathering of existing RTAs would 
discriminate against countries only recently entering into RTA activity.37 
2. WTO dispute settlement system 
 The Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV eliminated the un-
certainty that existed within the GATT system over whether challenges to 
RTAs within the dispute settlement system were possible38 by explicitly de-
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would not review the conformity of the agreements with GATT Art. XXIV because this could 
only be done within Art. XXIV:7 review proceedings. However, the panel seemed to accept 
a so-called non-violation nullification and impairment argument by the United States and so 
the EC blocked adoption of the report. After a series of retaliatory actions, a settlement was 
negotiated in 1986 in which the US pledged no further legal challenges in exchange for reduc-
tion in orange and lemon tariffs.’ Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law (1993). Note 
that the Bananas I (1991) and Bananas II (1994) GATT panels (both leading to unadopted re-
ports) also apparently faced Article XXIV defense issues being raised at the margins of the 
dispute. 
39. The WTO Appellate Body has examined Article XXIV’s RTA provisions in the 2000 Tur-
key Textiles case. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey--Restrictions on Imports of Textile and 
Clothing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R, adopted 19 November 1999. Turkey im-
posed quantitative restrictions on Indian textiles because otherwise the EU would not have 
agreed to include textiles in its RTA with Turkey. (Turkey indicated that if textiles were not 
included in the RTA, then the RTA would not meet the requirement of liberalizing substan-
tially all trade since such a large amount of EU-Turkey trade is in textiles). However, the Ap-
pellate Body did not examine whether the EU-Turkey RTA met the internal (substantially all) 
and external (barriers not on the whole higher or more restrictive) requirements of Art. XXIV 
because India did not present such a claim. Rather, the AB only decided that the QRs were 
not necessary, or more specifically that their absence would not have ‘prevented’ the forma-
tion of a CU between the EU and Turkey, since a certificate of origin scheme would have been 
a satisfactory alternative to prevent Indian textiles from being transshipped into the EU un-
der the EU-Turkey RTA. 
40. See, e.g. panel report in Turkey--Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R, 31 May 1999 (stating that ‘it would be erroneous to interpret the fact 
that a measure has not been subject to Art. XXIII over a number of years as tantamount to 
tacit acceptance by the contracting parties’). 
claring that the dispute settlement system is open to such challenges. Indeed, 
the Appellate Body stated (or at least very strongly hinted) in the 2000 Tur-
key Textiles case that they would examine the conformity of an RTA with the 
internal and external requirements of Article XXIV if presented with such a 
claim.39 Additionally, GATT/WTO jurisprudence does not recognize the con-
cept of latches (i.e. a long delay in challenging an RTA does not lead to a pre-
sumption of conformity of the RTA with Article XXIV).40 Therefore, a case 
against an RTA is a legal possibility. However, whether such a case becomes 
a reality depends on several factors. While at least some lawyers in the DC 
trade bar believe that a government could successfully pursue an RTA chal-
lenge, bringing such a case carries several risks. First, because nearly all WTO 
members are party to a RTA and the standards for reviewing conformity are 
so broad and imprecise, most members will see at least some defensive inter-
ests on the issue. Second, potential plaintiffs will need to consider the interac-
tion between the negotiations and an on-going dispute settlement case. If ne-
gotiations on RTAs within the Doha Round are leading to nothing fruitful, 
then a dispute settlement case might be the only hope for moving towards 
tangible constraints. It is a strategy not without risk, however, because if a 
case fails, then there will be even less motivation in the negotiations. Third, 
there is some institutional risk to the Appellate Body being viewed as ‘law 
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41. On the risks of ‘law making’, see generally Robert Hudec, Enforcing International Trade 
Law 364 (1993). But see also, John Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of 
International Law (2006) 184-186 (noting that ‘gaps and ambiguities’ do exist in all treaties, and 
that in some situations they are appropriately filled in by dispute settlement bodies). 
42. On tools of judicial restraint in the WTO, see generally William Davey, ‘Has the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority?’, 4 Journal of International Economic Law 79 
(2001). 
43. As a sign that the EU is aware of their potential exposure to such a claim, they tried at the 
very end of the Uruguay Round negotiations in December 1993 to have the Art. XXIV Under-
standing’s provisions on dispute settlement deleted. 
making’ given the broad, imprecise language such a claim would be based 
upon (similar to the controversy surrounding the Appellate Body’s rulings 
in the area of amicus briefs).41 Indeed, while the Appellate Body does not like 
to backtrack, it is possible that they would use a tool of judicial restraint to 
avoid actually directly addressing a complaint of this nature.42 
 Beyond these general considerations, the most likely plaintiff countries 
seem to have somewhat mixed interests in pursuing such a case. The coun-
tries historically most opposed to increased RTA activity (Japan, Korea, Sin-
gapore and Hong Kong), and most likely to be plaintiffs for systemic rea-
sons, are now negotiating and concluding RTAs themselves (signaling a ‘if 
you cannot beat them, join them’ mentality). One potential claim that might 
be made in a challenge to an RTA is that its failure to liberalize a major sec-
tor such as agriculture runs afoul of the ‘substantially all’ criteria for inter-
nal liberalization. However, Japan and Korea are defensive on agriculture is-
sues and unlikely to make that particular challenge. Indeed, Japan is having 
trouble making rapid progress in its RTA negotiations due to its agricultural 
sensitivities. Korea’s paper on RTAs in the Doha Round suggests it has many 
concerns with RTAs but it is unclear that they would choose to go the dis-
pute settlement route (at least until progress in the negotiations can be more 
clearly assessed). 
 The United States is another potential plaintiff. As evidenced by the 1980s 
challenge to the Euro-Med agreements (EC agreements with Mediteranean 
countries), a complaint by the United States against an RTA has been taken in 
the past and continues to be a possibility in the future. An EU RTA would be 
the likely target of any such case43 as the United States would surely not want 
to challenge a Latin American RTA for fear of further harming possibilities of 
reviving FTAA negotiations at some point in the future. However, the over-
all status of EU--US relations and some fatigue with other controversial cases 
suggests that another explosive case, such as an RTA complaint, is likely not 
in the cards in the near future either. 
 Australia (or another Cairns group member) is another possible plaintiff. 
Traditionally, it was thought third country agricultural exporters had no in-
terest in challenging agricultural-exclusions within RTAs (in essence asking 
to be subject to negative preference margins) but the impact of the large num-
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44. Article 3.16 of the US-Chile FTA is an example of where the parties pledge to cooperate in the 
WTO negotiations on a specific issue area, namely agricultural export subsidies disciplines. 
45. For example, apparently, the US was originally hesitant about ‘docking’ the Dominican Re-
public to the FTA with Central American countries because of positions the Dominican Re-
public was taking within WTO negotiations. 
ber of agricultural-excluded RTAs on multilateral liberalization (and/or the 
view that any RTA-induced agricultural reforms may eventually benefit or 
expand to third countries) may change this traditional calculation, although 
to date it has not. 
III. EFFORTS THE US CAN UNDERTAKE UNILATERALLY  
OR REGIONALLY TO ENSURE RTAS COMPLEMENT 
MULTILATERALISM 
 With fairly wide disagreement within the WTO negotiations as to how 
to ensure that RTAs complement the WTO system, and no plaintiff yet will-
ing to step forward within WTO dispute settlement system to challenge the 
broad legality of an RTA, the question is left as to what actions the United 
States, as the largest economy in the world and with much negotiating le-
verage, could take to ensure that at least its own growing regionalism com-
plements the WTO system. Specifically, the question is whether the United 
States has tools at its disposal as it pursues its regional agenda to ensure that 
other countries it partners with maintain an incentive to be forthcoming and 
cooperative in the WTO negotiations and that its RTAs are not overly trade 
diverting. In fact, there are a series of measures the United States could take 
unilaterally or in cooperation with their RTA partners using its negotiating 
leverage to minimize the harmful effects of regionalism on the WTO system, 
some of which the United States is already undertaking but that could be fur-
ther emphasized. These measures include the following: 
 * Explore the possibility of including obligations, not just preambular lan-
guage, in RTAs requiring WTO partner countries to cooperate positively 
within WTO negotiations, not just on specific issues but also more gener-
ally.44 While it might be hard to enforce such an obligation, it would cer-
tainly provide further negotiating leverage within the WTO when the 
United States asks for cooperation on progress in the WTO from an RTA 
partner country. 
 * Emphasize in broader diplomatic discussions with potential RTA part-
ner countries, the need for those countries to participate actively and pos-
itively in WTO negotiations,45 and continue to make WTO membership 
and cooperation a condition of launching RTA negotiations with a given 
country. 
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46. Of course, there is already some linkage between the broad regional (but now stalled) FTAA 
negotiations and the Doha negotiations being demanded by countries such as Brazil that may 
drive these two negotiations to be concluded at or around the same time. Brazil wants agri-
cultural subsidies issues and anti-dumping issues addressed prior to concluding the FTAA 
negotiations and the U.S. has made clear that these two issues can only (or largely) be ad-
dressed within the WTO negotiations. 
47. See, e.g. Robert Kunimoto and Gary Sawchuk, ‘Moving Towards a Customs Union: A Re-
view of the Evidence’, at http://policyresearch.gc.ca
* Explore the possibility of linking, either explicitly or de facto, RTA tariff 
cut accelerations (that reduce the amount of time it takes under an RTA 
to fully eliminate tariffs on a given product) to progress/concrete results 
in the WTO multilateral negotiations. In other words, say to RTA partners 
‘you keep your preference margins for the same amount of time even if 
you are forthcoming and cooperative in multilateral negotiations because 
we will reduce the preferential rate under the RTA faster as you cooperate 
to reduce MFN rates faster within the WTO’.46 
 * Continuing to explore and negotiate sectoral customs unions (i.e. harmo-
nize the tariffs charged to third countries) with RTA partners. Sectoral cus-
toms unions reduce the problems and costs associated with applying rules 
of origin. The United States already has a sectoral custom union with Can-
ada on computers and, given the similarity in MFN rates between the two 
countries, other sectoral customs unions are possible.47 
 * Continuing to liberalize rules of origin within existing RTAs where possible 
(e.g. as was done in 2002 and again in 2006 within NAFTA). 
 * Maintain and improve the high standards of trade coverage in the RTAs it 
concludes so as to minimize any defensive interests it has with respect to 
RTAs as regards WTO-compliance but continue to resist exempting RTA 
partner countries from US anti-dumping law. 
 It is important to realize that some of these measures are potentially polit-
ically difficult, such as tariff accelerations and rule of origin liberalization, de-
pending on what products are involved. Additionally, unlike WTO efforts, 
these US unilateral efforts cannot ‘clean-up’ or make more robust those RTAs 
to which it is not a party. Thus, these US efforts must be viewed as a supple-
ment, rather than a replacement, for efforts within the WTO to improve disci-
plines on RTAs. However, these US efforts could potentially have a more im-
mediate impact than efforts within the WTO. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 RTA activity by the United States and even other countries traditionally 
opposed to regionalism has rapidly expanded in the past decade. This trend 
is unlikely to be halted as political and diplomatic considerations will re-
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quire future FTAs even if the WTO negotiations process for further multi-
lateral liberalization is reinvigorated. Proponents of the WTO system have 
concerns that this RTA activity, as currently structured, may not be fulfill-
ing the original economic conditions creating the basis for the exception 
in the WTO system for RTAs. Specifically, there is much concern over the 
exclusion of agriculture from many RTAs, the use of highly complex and 
restrictive rules of origin within RTAs, and the varied treatment of trade 
remedies within RTAs. While the WTO has two mechanisms to cure these 
controversies, specifically its negotiating rounds and dispute settlement sys-
tem, doubts exist as to how much progress can be made utilizing these two 
mechanisms. As a result, and somewhat ironically, US unilateral efforts and 
use of US negotiating leverage with its RTA partners may be, at the very 
least, a necessary supplement to efforts in the WTO to ensure that RTAs are 
complementing the WTO system. 
 
